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Abstract
A quantum state represents neither properties of a physical system
nor anyone’s knowledge of its properties. The important question is not
what quantum states represent but how they are used—as informational
bridges. Knowing about some physical situations (its backing conditions),
an agent may assign a quantum state to form expectations about other
possible physical situations (its advice conditions). Quantum states are
objective: only expectations based on correct state assignments are gen-
erally reliable. If a quantum state represents anything, it is the objective
probabilistic relations between its backing conditions and its advice con-
ditions. This paper offers an account of quantum states and their function
as informational bridges, in quantum teleportation and elsewhere.
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the quantum state of a Qbit or a collection of Qbits is not a
property carried by those Qbits, but a way of concisely summarizing
everything we know that has happened to them, to enable us to
make statistical predictions about the information we might then be
able to extract from them. (N. David Mermin [2007, p. 109])
1 Introduction
In his recent extended review article, Matt Leifer [2014] classifies the pragma-
tist view of quantum theory sketched in my [2012a] as ψ-epistemic rather than
ψ-ontic while acknowledging that the ψ-ontology theorems he discusses do not
apply to it. But as he draws the ψ-ontic/ψ-epistemic distinction in his intro-
duction, that pragmatist view counts as neither ψ-epistemic nor ψ-ontic. It does
not view |ψ〉 as describing some independently existing property of the system
to which it is assigned, but nor does it take a quantum state to exist only in the
minds and calculations of quantum theorists. This paper is intended to clarify
my [2012a] view of the quantum state, and to show how |ψ〉 refers to something
that objectively exists in the world, independently of any observer or agent,
and would still exist if all intelligent beings were suddenly wiped out from the
universe—which is how Leifer characterizes an ontic state.
A quantum state (given by a wave-function, vector or density operator)
represents neither properties of a physical system to which it is assigned, nor
anyone’s knowledge of its properties. The important question is not what quan-
tum states represent but how they are used—as informational bridges. Knowing
about some physical situations (its backing conditions), an agent may assign a
quantum state to form expectations about certain other possible physical situ-
ations (its advice conditions). Quantum states are objective: only expectations
based on correct state assignments are generally reliable. But a quantum state
represents neither its backing conditions nor its advice conditions.
Since its main function is to provide information on what advice condi-
tions to expect given prevailing backing conditions, it may be said to represent
probabilistic relations between backing conditions and advice conditions. These
probabilistic relations are objective: they would exist in a world without agents,
as long as that world featured patterns of statistical regularity that were suf-
ficiently stable to be modeled by Born probabilities of the values of physical
magnitudes that specify what I have called advice conditions. We can use
quantum theory successfully because (or at least in so far as) they do exist in
our world.
As physically situated, and so epistemically limited, a user of quantum
theory can assign quantum states on the basis of what that agent is in a position
to know, in order to form reasonable expectations about what that agent is not
in a position to know. That is how quantum states function as informational
bridges. A quantum state provides a sturdy informational bridge only if it would
be the right state to assign for any agent in that physical, and therefore epis-
temic, situation—only if it refers to the actual probabilistic relations between
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its accessible backing conditions and inaccessible advice conditions.
Here is the structure of the rest of the paper. By distinguishing between
quantum mathematical models and their physical applications section 2 shows
how a precise formulation of quantum theory may be given without using terms
like ‘measurement’, ‘observation’, ‘information’ or ‘agent’. Any account of how
the theory is applied must mention agents who may apply it: agents are (poten-
tial) users of quantum models—they are not mentioned in those models. Any
application of a quantum model is perspectival—it is from the perspective of a
hypothetical, physically situated, agent. So to say how a model of quantum the-
ory is applied we need a rough physical characterization of this situation as what
I will call an agent-situation. Section 2 supplies this and clarifies the notions of
backing conditions and advice conditions. A correct quantum state assignment
is relative to an agent-situation because these conditions are a function of that
situation. Section 3 shows the worth of these ideas in explaining how quantum
theory works in some applications that have been thought to raise problems of
”wave collapse” and causal anomalies. Chris Timpson [2013] used his analysis
of quantum informationt as a sequence of quantum states to demystify the issue
of information flow in quantum teleportation. But there is more to be said if
a quantum state itself functions as an informational bridge: I say it in section
4. The paper concludes by summarizing its main points and relating them to
recent work in quantum foundations.
2 Quantum states: Objective but relational
In discussing quantum states we should start by distinguishing the state itself
from any of its mathematical representatives, including |Ψ〉 (or a wave-function
representation such as ψ(r1, ..., rn)), ρˆ, or (as in AQFT) ω : A −→ C. As a
mathematical object, none of these representatives of a quantum state exists in
the physical world: what is at issue is the nature and function of the quantum
state such objects purport to represent. But that issue is best approached
indirectly, by studying the role of a mathematical representative of a quantum
state in an application of a mathematical model of quantum theory of which it
is one element.
Such models take different forms in different kinds of quantum the-
ory, but since the same issue arises for each I’ll consider only models of non-
relativistic quantum mechanics of the form Θ= 〈H, T,Ψ,A, µ〉. In an applica-
tion, the interval of real numbers T will represent an interval of time while t ∈ T
represents a moment in that interval. Each operator in A is linear: in an applica-
tion a self-adjoint operator Aˆ will correspond uniquely to a dynamical variable
A. The self-adjoint operator Hˆ corresponding to energy is associated with a
family of unitary operators Uˆt = exp iHˆt that define the possible trajectories
of |Ψ(t)〉 (in the Schro¨dinger picture). The measure µ assigns, at each t ∈ T ,
a number in the interval [0, 1] to each subspace K of H such that µ(H) = 1,
µ(∅) = 0 and if Ki ⊥ Kj for i 6= j then µ(L) =
∑
i µ(Ki), where L = ∨iKi is the
span of the Ki. In an application some values of µ may yield Born probabilities.
3
To apply a model of the form Θ one first chooses the dimension of a
Hilbert space H in which to represent a quantum state Ψ of a physical system s
over a period of time T and a particular Hˆ on H: then one assigns a particular
initial state |Ψ(t0)〉 to s. This picks out a unique trajectory |Ψ(t)〉 and so a
particular state |Ψ(t1)〉 at a later time t1 ∈ T . Next one chooses a pairwise-
commuting family F = {Aˆ, Bˆ, ...} of self-adjoint operators on H corresponding
to dynamical variables A,B, ... respectively. One can now apply the Born rule
in the form
Pr([A ∈ Γ]&[B ∈ ∆]&...) = 〈Ψ(t1)|PA(Γ).PB(∆)...|Ψ(t1)
〉
(1)
= µΨ(t1)(MAΓ ∧MB∆ ∧ ...)
where the elements PA(Γ), PB(∆), .. of the spectral measures of Aˆ, Bˆ, ... project
onto subspaces MAΓ ,MB∆, ... respectively of H. This yields a joint probability
distribution for the values of dynamical variables A,B, ... on s at t1.
While nowhere explicitly mentioning measurement or preparation, this
familiar account may seem implicitly to depend on these notions. Doesn’t as-
signment of a particular state to a system at t0 require knowledge of how this
has been prepared? Don’t Born probabilities refer only to the outcome of a joint
measurement at t1 of a compatible family of dynamical variables defined by the
measurement context? And doesn’t the applicability of the model at time t1
presuppose that no measurement occurred between t0 and t1?
In fact one can say what warrants assignment of a quantum state and
what circumstances license application of the Born rule without mentioning
preparation or measurement. In each case it is simply the prevailing physical
conditions that supply the necessary warrant, whether or not anyone seeks to
exploit these to prepare the system’s state or make a measurement on it. In
the first case I call these backing conditions, since when they obtain they back
assignment of a particular quantum state. In the second case environmental
conditions determine when and how the Born rule may legitimately be applied
to provide reliable advice about the values of certain dynamical variables, in the
form of what I call advice conditions.
I headed this paper with a quote from David Mermin in which he char-
acterizes a quantum state of a system as a way of concisely summarizing every-
thing we know that has happened to it.1 The knowledge of which he speaks is
knowledge of backing conditions. Knowing a state’s backing conditions, one is
justified in assigning that state: but one would be warranted in assigning the
state whether or not one knew these conditions, just as a test result may warrant
a diagnosis whether or not the doctor knows about it. I’ll give several examples
of backing conditions later. For now it is important only that they may be
stated in purely physical language, with no talk of observers or agents and their
measuring or preparing activities. But nor does this statement involve talk of
quantum states, operators or Hilbert space measures: such talk is confined to
the mathematical model being applied.
1In two earlier papers (Mermin [2002], Brun, T., Finkelstein, J. and Mermin, N.D. [2002])
he had raised and answered the question ”Whose knowledge?”.
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Advice conditions are stated in a more restricted physical language be-
cause of how they figure in the Born rule. When legitimately applied, that rule
yields probabilities for what I’ll call magnitude claims : The value of dynamical
variable M on physical system s lies in ∆ is a canonical magnitude claim which
I’ll write as Ms ∈ ∆. Magnitude claims are used to state advice conditions—
so-called because they are the topic of the Born rule’s probabilistic advice. But
that advice is necessarily selective. The Born rule yields joint probabilities only
for magnitude claims corresponding to commuting projection operators, and
Gleason’s [1957] theorem and other results show that these typically cannot all
be recovered as marginals of any underlying joint distribution.
Restrictions on use of the Born rule are needed to ensure its consistent
application to a system, but these arise naturally from the physical circum-
stances in which that system finds itself. Θ provides an adequate quantum
model of a system s only while s remains isolated from interaction with other
quantum systems: If s is subjected to such interactions, this can also be modeled
by the unitary evolution of a joint quantum state in an expanded Hilbert space.
In various models of decoherence this extremely rapidly and essentially irre-
versibly results in the delocalization of phase of the quantum state of s and/or
a system α with which it interacts into the wider environment, thereby picking
out a preferred ”pointer basis” of orthogonal subspaces in their Hilbert space(s).
The Born rule may be legitimately applied to s only when such de-
coherence has occurred, and then only to those privileged magnitude claims
corresponding to projection operators onto subspaces in the relevant pointer
basis.2 Such decoherence is never perfect, and nor is a ”pointer basis” pre-
cisely determined and perfectly constant. But the advice provided by the Born
rule concerning only magnitude claims privileged by pointer bases in the same
narrow neighborhood will be consistent and typically prove reliable: the corre-
sponding advice conditions will typically obtain with relative frequencies closely
corresponding to their Born rule probabilities.
You and I may know different things about what has happened to a
quantum system. Should we then assign the system different quantum states?
If you have simply noticed something I missed, or I have forgotten something
you remember, then one of us has not made use of all the available information:
our quantum state assignment should be based on all the information to which
we have access. But the information to which an agent has access depends on
that agent’s physical situation.
A single agent gains access to additional information merely with the
passage of time, while spatially separated agents have access to different infor-
mation just because they are in different places. It is not only spatiotemporal
location that imposes physical limits on one’s knowledge of what has happened
to a system. Acquisition of observational knowledge depends on the presence of
physical channels capable of conveying that knowledge to the observer, which is
why it is so hard to observe dark matter in distant galaxies. The upshot is that
when an agent assigns a quantum state the conditions backing that assignment
2For further details, see my [2012b].
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are a function of the agent’s physical situation.
We often apply quantum theory not to the actual world but to some sim-
plified or otherwise modified variant of it—to a merely possible world. Clearly
the agent applying the model is not located in that merely possible world. But
even such applications are from the perspective of some merely possible agent in
that world—the perspective of what I will call an agent-situation. All applica-
tions of quantum theory are from the perspective of a physically-characterized
agent-situation. Applications to merely possible worlds make it particularly
clear that no agent need occupy such an agent-situation.
An agent-situation is characterized, in part, by a space-time region
marking the momentary location of a hypothetical agent. It is common to ideal-
ize the histories of observers by timelike curves in a relativistic space-time—their
world-lines. In this idealization the space-time location of an agent-situation
would be a point p on such a curve. Since no physical processes can convey
information faster than light, no agent at p would have observational access
to anything outside the past light cone of p. So the backing conditions for a
quantum state assignment relative to p lie in (or on) the past light cone of p.
A quantum state assignment to a system relative to p will be a function
of everything in the past light cone of p (though much of what happens there will
prove irrelevant). But it is important to notice that quantum state assignments
relative to p,q may differ: conditions obtaining in the past light cone of p may
back a different assignment than conditions obtaining in the past light cone of
q. Since every quantum state assignment is relative to an agent-situation it is
misleading to speak of a system’s being in a quantum state, as if this expressed
a property of that system rather than a relation to the agent-situation from
whose perspective it is assigned.
3 Some applications
Before moving on to its application to the phenomenon of quantum teleporta-
tion, I’ll consider two illustrative examples of this account of quantum states
as objective informational bridges—violation of Bell inequalities and delayed
choice entanglement-swapping.
Quantum theory correctly predicts the violations of Bell inequalities
that have been observed in experiments involving space-like separated measure-
ments of linear polarization on polarization-entangled photon pairs (EPR-Bohm
pairs) (Weihs et al. [1998]). Bell [2004] used these predictions to argue that
quantum theory is not a locally causal theory. Maudlin [2011] argued further
that space-like (superluminal) influences must be present in experiments ver-
ifying them: Price [1996], on the other hand, suggested their results might
be explained by retrocausal influences. One way for a measurement on one
photon in an EPR-Bohm pair to influence the result of a spacelike separated
measurement on the other photon would be through ”collapsing its quantum
state”—just the kind of ”spooky” action at a distance Einstein rejected. Any
such instantaneous collapse would threaten to reintroduce an absolute notion of
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simultaneity into a relativistic space-time from which it had been successfully
excised.
In fact quantum theory may be applied to explain EPR-Bohm correla-
tions with no superluminal or retro- causation and no physical quantum state
reduction.3 The relativization of quantum states to agent-situation is key to this
explanation. An entangled state Φ+ = 1/
√
2(|HH〉 + |V V 〉) may be correctly
assigned to the pair relative to an agent-situation with location p in the past
light cone of either of the space-like separated polarization measurement events:
its backing conditions (in the past light cone of p) include whatever physical
conditions the experimenters used to prepare that state, such as parametric
down-conversion of laser light by passage through a non-linear crystal.
Because of decoherence at the detectors, the Born rule is legitimately
applied to this state to yield an equal chance of either outcome of any linear
polarization measurement at either detector, but chance cos2∠ab that the two
detectors will yield the same outcome for linear polarization measurements with
respect to axes inclined at an angle ∠ab to one another. It is important to stress
that these chances are also relative to agent-situation with location p. For
anyone who accepts quantum theory, they give the objectively correct advice to
one located at p about how firmly to believe the corresponding outcome(s) will
be recorded. Thus state Φ+ acts as an informational bridge between its backing
conditions and its advice conditions by enabling anyone informed of its backing
conditions to form reliable expectations concerning it advice conditions.
Consider instead an agent situation with location q in the future light
cone of recording event 1 but not of recording event 2. Relative to q, the correct
quantum polarization state to assign to the distant photon in the past light cone
of 2 depends on the outcome at 1: suppose it is Va, where linear polarization
at 1 was measured with respect to axis a. Then |Va〉 is the correct quantum
state to assign to the distant photon, relative to agent situation with location q.
This is not because ”the” quantum state of the pair has collapsed: the correct
quantum state to assign relative to agent-situation with location p is still 12 1ˆ—
the reduced state of Φ+. The correct state relative to agent situation with
location q is |Va〉 because the outcome at 1 is in the past light cone of q, and so
counts as an additional accessible backing condition determining the assignment
of a quantum state relative to q. Relative to agent situation with location q the
chance of outcome Vb at 2 is cos
2
∠ab, as follows from the legitimate application
of the Born rule to state |Va〉. Here it is state |Va〉 that acts as an informational
bridge between its (augmented) backing conditions and its advice conditions.
These applications of quantum theory explain the patterns of correla-
tion that are taken to violate CHSH inequalities by showing that they were to
be expected and what they depend on. Both individual outcome events and
the event of their joint occurrence depend causally on the physical conditions
backing assignment of Φ+ since an agent could affect the chances of these events
by modifying those backing conditions. But there is no causal dependence of
one outcome event on the other, since no-one who accepts quantum theory
3For a fuller account see my [forthcoming].
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can countenance the possibility of an agent’s modifying either outcome while
keeping fixed both detectors’ settings and the conditions backing Φ+. Nor do
the detector settings have any retrocausal influence on events acknowledged by
quantum theory.
Now consider delayed-choice entanglement-swapping. Suppose two EPR-
Bohm photon pairs 〈1, 2〉, 〈3, 4〉 are independently prepared in conditions back-
ing assignment of Bell states Ψ−12,Ψ
−
34
Ψ− = 1/
√
2(|HV 〉 − |V H〉). (2)
First assume a Bell-state measurement is conducted on 〈2, 3〉, and the result
noted. Conditional on a particular result, one of four different entangled states
may then be assigned to the pair 〈1, 4〉. This is entanglement-swapping.4 The
particular entangled state of 〈1, 4〉 may be verified by quantum tomography in
the usual way, and violation of Bell inequalities demonstrated. Alternatively,
assume the linear polarizations of each of 2, 3 are measured independently (in-
stead of the Bell-state measurement). No matter what the outcomes of the
measurements on 2, 3, measurements of linear polarization on 1, 4 will reveal no
correlations: since the states then assigned to 1, 4 are not entangled their joint
probability distribution will factorize.
So far I have said nothing about when and where the measurements
on 1, 4 occur, relative to those on 2, 3. In a standard case of entanglement-
swapping, the Bell-state measurement B23 on 2, 3 occurs time-like earlier than
each of the measurements M1,M4 on 1, 4. But the correlations between the
outcomes of measurements M1,M4 conditional on a particular (joint) outcome
of a Bell-state measurement B23 do not depend on the space-time intervals
I(B23,M1), I(B23,M4). If B23 occurs timelike later than M1,M4 then we have
an apparent case of ”retrocausal entanglement swapping”. Since the choice of
whether to perform B23 or independent polarization measurementsM2,M3 may
be made at random after photons 1, 4 have been absorbed into their detectors,
this has also been called delayed choice entanglement-swapping.5
Relative to an agent-situation located just in the overlap of the future
light cones of their production events, the correct initial polarization state Ψ to
assign to the photons is
∣∣Ψ−12
〉 ∣∣Ψ−34
〉
= 1/2(
∣∣Ψ+14
〉 ∣∣Ψ+23
〉− ∣∣Ψ−14
〉 ∣∣Ψ−23
〉− ∣∣Φ+14
〉 ∣∣Φ+23
〉
+
∣∣Φ−14
〉 ∣∣Φ−23
〉
. (3)
Analysis of the actual experimental setup of Ma et al. [2013] shows that cases
(i) in which B23 records one photon as detected to each side of the beam split-
ter (with the same polarization) have non-zero Born probability only from the
fourth term in (3), while cases (ii) in which B23 records both photons as de-
tected to the same side of the beam splitter (with opposite polarizations) have
non zero Born probability only from the third term in (3). What would be the
correct state to assign to the remaining photons, relative to an agent-situation
4By adding a classical channel it may be used to teleport entanglement of a Qbit.
5By Peres [2000]. This has been realized experimentally by Ma et al. [2013].
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located just in the future light cone of B23? In case (i) the corresponding 〈1, 4〉
pair should be assigned the quantum state Φ−14, while in case (ii) the correspond-
ing pair should be assigned Φ+14. These would be the correct state assignments
irrespective of the space-time intervals I(B23,M1), I(B23,M4).
A recent paper (Egg [2013, p.1133]) rejects that conclusion as follows (I
have changed his notation to conform to mine):
The Bell measurement on the 〈2, 3〉 pair allows us to sort the
〈1, 4〉 pairs into four subensembles corresponding to the four Bell
states. Without delayed choice, this has physical significance, be-
cause each 〈1, 4〉 pair really is in such a state after the 〈2, 3〉 mea-
surement [B23]. But if the 〈1, 4〉 measurements [M1,M4] precede
[B23], the 〈1, 4〉 pair never is in any of these states. ... Therefore,
far from being committed to any indeterminacy about entanglement
(or any backward-in-time influences) a realistic view of the quan-
tum state yields a perfectly clear assessment of what happens in
entanglement-swapping: If [B23] occurs at a time the complete sys-
tem is still in state Ψ, it confers entanglement on the 〈1, 4〉 pair, if
it occurs at a later time it does not.
In section 2 I warned against talk of a system’s being in a quantum state
(as opposed to being assigned the correct quantum state relative to a particular
agent-situation). We can see how this leads to problems by reflecting on a case
of entanglement-swapping in which the intervals I(B23,M1), I(B23,M4) are
space-like. In this case the distinction to which Egg appeals has no invariant
significance: whether M1 or M4 precedes B23 depends on an arbitrary choice of
reference frame. Egg is not unaware of this problem: he admits (p.1130) that his
”reality-of-states” view should take state reduction seriously, so that the change
of description on ”measurement” corresponds to a real physical change. His
”solution” ( footnote 7, p.1130) is to appeal to a definite (although undetectable)
temporal ordering between any two events—a preferred foliation of space-time
such as that required by alternative theories including Bohmian mechanics.
But there is no physical process of state reduction, and no need to appeal
to any undetectable space-time foliation to understand entanglement-swapping
or violation of Bell inequalities. The reassignment of a quantum state associated
with relativizing it to a different agent-situation is not a physical process. It
is typically required because additional backing conditions are accessible from
the second agent-situation. The discussion of EPR-Bohm correlations provided
an example: |Va〉 is the correct quantum state to assign to the distant photon
relative to agent-situation q while the correct quantum state to assign relative to
agent-situation with location p is 12 1ˆ: each of these quantum states is objective,
but there is no question as to which quantum state the distant photon ”is in”.
When an entangled state is assigned to the pair 〈1, 4〉 conditional on
the outcome of B23 this state functions as an objective informational bridge in
the usual way, irrespective of the space-time intervals I(B23,M1), I(B23,M4).
What distinguishes the case in which B23 occurs invariantly later than M1,M4
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is the fact that if appropriate physical channels were in place the outcomes of
M1,M4 would be accessible from the space-time location of B23. In that case
there would be no point in using the entangled state assigned to the pair 〈1, 4〉
as an informational bridge to form expectations as to these outcomes, since
knowledge as to what they were would already be available at the space-time
location of B23.
This illustrates the important point that there is more to an agent-
situation than its space-time location. A physical characterization of an agent
situation located just in the future light cone of B23 specifies either the presence
or the absence of physical channels connecting this location to the outcomes
of M1,M4: only if no such channels are in place is it necessary to assign an
entangled state to 〈1, 4〉 conditional on the outcome of B23, since only relative
to that agent-situation does this state assignment provide the best available
information concerning the outcomes of M1,M4. In a case in which B23 occurs
invariantly earlier thanM1,M4, or space-like separated from them, an entangled
state must always be assigned to 〈1, 4〉 relative to any agent-situation located
just in the future light cone of B23 and backed by the outcome of B23, because
no physical channels could give access to the outcomes of M1,M4 from that
space-time location.
4 Information in quantum teleportation
Chris Timpson devotes two chapters of his [2013] to a discussion of information
flow in quantum teleportation. His conclusion is largely deflationary
we have been able to replace the (needlessly) conceptually puzzling
question of how the informationt gets from Alice to Bob in tele-
portation, with the simple, genuine question of what the physical
processes involved in teleportation are. (p. 86)
He had previously proposed a helpful analysis of the technical notion of
informationt after distinguishing this from our everyday, informal notion. This
locates quantum informationt as a species of Shannon information:
pieces of quantum informationt are certain abstract items—sequences
of quantum states (types)
As abstracta, pieces of quantum informationt ... do not themselves
have a spatio-temporal location; it is their tokens (if any) which do.
(p. 65)
A token of quantum informationt is then a concrete instance of an abstract
sequence of quantum states. The simplest example of a token of quantum
informationt is a single (physical) Qbit. Quantum teleportation is a physical
process in which a Qbit associated with state |χ〉 is initially located only at
A and a Qbit associated with state |χ〉 is finally located at B while the Qbit
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formerly located at A is no longer associated with state |χ〉. In this way the
abstract piece of quantum informationt previously instantiated only at A is now
instantiated only at B.
Among the remarkable features of quantum teleportation is that it en-
ables Alice to teleport an unknown quantum state to Bob. After its successful
execution Alice and Bob both know that the state now associated with Bob’s
Qbit is the same state formerly associated with Alice’s, but neither Alice nor
Bob need know what this state is. A teleported state may be unknown to Alice
and Bob because neither of them knows what had happened to Alice’s Qbit
before she got hold of it.
One can accept Timpson’s helpful analysis without saying anything
about the nature and function of quantum states. But suppose the quantum
state of a Qbit is a way of concisely summarizing everything we know that has
happened to it. If there is no-one but Alice and Bob, then the quantum state
they teleport may be a way of concisely summarizing knowledge that no-one
knows—an unknown known! Clearly something has gone wrong. Not even
Donald Rumsfeld countenances unknown knowns.6 Correcting the errors lead-
ing to this paradoxical conclusion will prove very helpful in arriving at a clearer
understanding of quantum states as objective informational bridges.
One can think of quantum teleportation as bridging an informational
gap by reproducing a token of quantum informationt at a distant location. But
the notion of information involved in calling a quantum state an informational
bridge is not the technical notion (informationt) analyzed by Timpson but the
ordinary notion. A token of quantum informationt is itself an informational
bridge in this ordinary sense: it bridges the gap between the state’s backing
conditions and its advice conditions. It is backing conditions in the past light
cone of p that determine the objectively correct initial quantum state to assign
to Alice’s Qbit, relative to p. What those backing conditions are depends both
on the space-time location of p and on the presence of physical channels capable
of giving access to them from p.
Consider Alice’s situation at space-time location A as she receives her
Qbit to be teleported to Bob at B. Reliable teleportation requires a (classical)
physical channel connecting A to B. So whatever conditions K back assignment
of initial state |χ〉 to Alice’s Qbit relative to an agent-situation with location A
apparently also back assignment of initial state |χ〉 to Alice’s Qbit relative to
an agent-situation with location B. If no teleportation actually occurred, Bob
would not have his own Qbit in state |χ〉 at B, but he would appear to be in as
good a position as Alice to assign state |χ〉 to Alice’s Qbit at A.
How could Alice not know what state to assign to her Qbit at A? Per-
haps Carol agreed to prepare this Qbit for Alice at A by taking a Qbit (they
both agree to be) correctly assigned state |0〉 and subjecting it to a unitary
transformation into state |χ〉 = a |0〉 + b |1〉 without telling Alice what that
transformation was. Whatever physical conditions K ′ involved in implementing
6Although the authors of a documentary film about him called it The Unknown Known,
suggesting that he might have been one.
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Carol’s unitary transformation backing her assignment of |χ〉 occurred in the
past light cone of A, but in the absence of physical channels capable of giving an
agent at A access to K ′ those conditions would not back assignment of |χ〉 rel-
ative to Alice’s agent-situation at A.7 Then Alice at A should not assign state
|χ〉 relative to her agent-situation, while correctly maintaining that her Qbit
should be assigned some initial pure state, relative to a different agent-situation
such as Carol’s just after implementing her unitary transformation.
In fact Bob at B is in a similar position. The existence of the spe-
cific physical channel required for reliable teleportation does not guarantee the
existence of any other physical channel capable of giving access at B to condi-
tions K that back assignment of initial state |χ〉 to Alice’s Qbit relative to her
agent-situation at A. If those conditions are physically inaccessible from B then
they do not back assignment of initial state |χ〉 to Alice’s Qbit relative to Bob’s
agent-situation at B. In that case Bob at B should not assign a state to Alice’s
Qbit, while correctly maintaining that her Qbit should be assigned some initial
pure state, relative to a different agent-situation such as Alice’s or Carol’s.
There is even a scenario in which initial pure state |χ〉 correctly assigned
to Alice’s Qbit by Carol (relative to her agent-situation just after preparing it) is
unknown to Alice but known to Bob. This would involve the presence of physical
channels rendering the conditions K ′ accessible from Bob’s agent-situation at
B but the absence of physical channels rendering conditions K ′ accessible from
Alice’s agent-situation at A. In this scenario a quantum state unknown to Alice
could be known to Bob whether or not it was teleported from Alice to Bob!
To sum up, conditions in the past light cone of an agent-situation G
may back assignment of a quantum state to a system relative to some other
agent-situation H , without backing assignment of a quantum state relative to
G. Alice and/or Bob may each be in such an agent-situation in a case of
quantum teleportation. That is how it can make sense to speak of teleporting
an unknown quantum state: it makes sense when the state correctly assigned
relative to Carol’s agent-situation is unknown to Alice and/or Bob, at least one
of whom is in an agent-situation relative to which no quantum state assignment
is possible. Since an agent-situation need not be occupied by any actual agent,
Carol’s presence is not required.
5 Conclusion
A quantum state functions as an informational bridge between its backing con-
ditions and its advice conditions. Since it is assigned from the perspective of a
physically-characterized agent-situation, what quantum state is assigned is rela-
tive to that agent-situation. But this does not make quantum state assignments
subjective or dependent on the epistemic state of any agent. Quantum state
assignments are objectively correct or incorrect: only correct state assignments
are reliable informational bridges. What makes them reliable are the patterns of
7But doesn’t Carol herself provide such a physical channel? Not if all traces of what she
did have been erased from her brain and the rest of her body.
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statistical correlation between their backing conditions and their advice condi-
tions that obtain in the physical world. There are objectively correct quantum
state assignments whether or not there are any agents capable of making them.
But it is physically situated, and so epistemically limited, agents who naturally
take the perspective of an agent-situation and so find it useful to assign quantum
states from that perspective.
Are quantum states real? If they are, what do they represent? There are
real patterns of statistical correlation in the physical world. Correctly assigned
quantum states reliably track these through legitimate applications of the Born
rule. But the Born rule does not directly describe these patterns: the frequen-
cies they display are not in exact conformity to that rule—the unexpected does
happen. A quantum state is real in so far as it specifies the real probabilis-
tic relations between its backing conditions and its advice conditions. Those
probabilistic relations are objective. What they are depends on conditions in
the physical world, even though probability statements do not directly describe
those conditions. So a quantum state is not an element of physical reality (it is
not a beable): |ψ〉 does not represent a physical system or its properties. But
it is real nonetheless. The world contains quantum states just as it contains
probabilities, physicists and their journals.
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